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A. IN GENERAL
doctrine that a litigant must
THE
exhaust his administrative remedies
The prior to seeking judicial relief performs
much the same function as the comparable rule in trial courts that an appeal can be taken only from a final
order. The exhaustion doctrine, like the
rule of finality, is concerned with the
Of" timing of judicial review of administrative action. Where the exhaustion doctrine is applicable, it requires that the
administrative proceeding reach its completion before judicial review may be
of
obtained.
Although federal and state courts
have often repeated the statement that
judicial relief must be denied until ade
ministrative remedies have been exhausted, the case law does not support
this extreme position. State and federal
in courts have often provided judicial relief in the absence of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Professor Kenueth

Doct 1rine
of
Exhaus tion

Administrative
Remedies
Micigan

C. Davis reaches the following coiclusions:
The law embodied in the holdings
clearly is that sometimes exhaustion is
required and sometimes not. No court
requires exhaustion when exhaustion will
involve irreparable injury and when the
agency is palpably witkout jurisdiction;
probably every court reqdi s exhaustion
when the question i31tsented is one
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within the agency's specialization and
when the administrative remedy is as
likely as the judicial remedy to provide
the wanted relief. In between these extremes is a vast array of problems on
which judicial action is variable and
difficult or impossible to predict.1
The most common type of exhaustion
problem involves attempts to challenge
the jurisdiction of an agency in advance of completion of an administrative proceeding. Myers v. Bethlehem
Shipbuilding Corp.2 is the leading federal case requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. The NLRB issued a complaint against the company
charging unfair labor practices. After
the case had been set for hearing, the
company filed a bill in equity in a federal district court to enjoin the holding
of the hearing, alleging that the Board
was exceeding its constitutional powers
because the company's products were
not sold in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the hearing would
cause irreparable damage not only by
reason of direct cost and loss of time
but also because of serious impairment
of good will and harmonious relations
existing between the corporation and
its employees. The Supreme Court held
that "no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
mtil the prescribed administrative remedly has been exhausted."- But the
court's broad language is contradicted
by the holdings of many cases in which
the court has passed upon questions of
administrative jurisdiction without requiring 4exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
1. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise
§20.01 (1958).
2. 303 U.S. 41, 58 S. Ct. 459 (1938).
3. 303 U.S. at 51. 58 S. Ct. at 463.

4. MeCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 83 S. Ct. 671
(1963); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184,
79 S. Ct. 180 (1958); Allen v. Grand
Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535, 74 S.Ct.
745 (1954); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767, 67 S. Ct. 1026 (1947) (state courts
had first decided jurisdiction without imposing exhaustion requirement); Order of
Railway Conductors of America v. Swan,
329 U.S. 520, 67 S. Ct. 405 (1947)

BAR
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The McCulloch case" is illustrative of
the cases allowing injunctive relief despite the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. A foreign shipowner
sought to enjoin the Regional Director
of the NLRB from holding a representation election. The court said nothing of
the "long-settled rule of judicial administration" which it had stated in absolute terms in the Myers case. It justified
district court jurisdiction to enjoin by
saying:
• . . While here the Board has violated
no specific prohibition in the Act, the
overriding consideration is that the
Board's assertion of power to determine

the representation of foreign seamen
aboard vessels under foreign flags has
aroused vigorous protests from foreign
governments and created international
problems for our Government. Important interests of the immediate parties
are of course at stake. But the presence
of public questions particularly high in
the scale of our national interest because of their international complexion
is a uniquely compelling justification
for prompt judicial resolution of the controversy over the Board's power.
In short, the question whether judicial relief is available prior to the conpletion of the administrative proceeding
rests upon a balancing of the reasons for
and against requiring exhaustion in the
particular situation.
1. Principal reasons for requiring exhaustion. A number of cases rely on
technical legal grounds in requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies -in
particular situations: (a) a court of
equity will not grant equitable relief
if an adequate remedy at law, i.e., the
administrative remedy and judicial review thereof, is available; 7 (b) an im(stalemate between two divisions of National Railroad Adjustment Board); Publie
Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United
Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456, 63 S. Ct. 369
(1943); Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 557, 39 S. Ct. 375 (1919).
5. 372 U.S. 10, 83 S. Ct. 671 (1963).
6. 373 U.S., at 16-17, 83 S. Ct. at 675.
7. E.g., School District of Royal Oak v.
State Tenure Comm'n, 367 Mich. 689, 117
N.W.2d 181, 183 (1962): ". .. Equity
should not be used to obtain iriiiinctivw
relief where there is no proof that cornplainant would suffer irreparable injury."
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plicatioll or express statement in the
particular statute that a "final" order
is necessary for judicial review;8 and
(c) the statement that the review procedure prescribed by statute is the "exclusive" method of judicial review.0 Although these formal arguments are
stated in a number of cases, the practical considerations that underlie the exhaustion doctrine are more important in
determining actual results. The practical
considerations favoring the exhaustion
doctrine have to do with furthering orderly procedure, preserving the efficiency of the administrative process, conserving judicial energies, and properly
allocating responsibilities between agencies and courts. Among the most important considerations are the following:
(a) precipitate resort to a court involves
the same problems of delay, disruption
and expense that may result from interlocutory appeals from trial courts; (b)
in some instances, application and interpretation of law by a court is greatly
assisted by the full development of the
factual context by a prior administrative
hearing: (c) the complainant may win
before the agency, making resolution of
the question posed to the court unnecessary; and (d) there are some issues
which fall within administrative discretion (i.e., the agency has greater relative competence on the particular issue
than a reviewing court).
2. Reasons for not requiring exhaustion.
The usual blanket statement of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies rests upon several premises relating to the nature of the administrative remedy that is involved: (a) the
administrative remedy must be avail8. E.g., Eastern Utilities Associates v.
SEC, 162 F.2d 385 (1st Cir. 1947), in
which a Boston company sought judicial
review of an administrative order setting
a case for hearing in Philadelphia. The
court held that "administrative orders of a
merely preliminary or procedural character are not directly and immediately reviewable." 162F.2d, at 386.
9. Cf. Laffness v. Yaeger, 352 Mich. 468,
90 N.W.2d 487 (1958) (where statute provided for review of pension determination
by certiorari, declaratory judgment action
was unavailable).

JOURNAL

able on his own initiative to the person
seeking judicial review; (b) it must not
involve unreasonable delay or expense;
and (c) the administrative remedy must
substantially protect the individual's
claim of right. It is clear that no exhaustion is required if these preconditions do not exist. Moreover, the exhaustion doctrine is a discretionary doorclosing doctrine which need not be applied even when these basic conditions
are satisfied. Other circumstances may
outweigh the reasons supporting the exhaustion rule. Among the most important circumstances justifying nonapplication of the exhaustion rule are the following: (a) the extent of injury from
pursuit of the administrative remedy;
(b) the relative importance of the issue
raised to the integrity of the administrative process or to the competency of
the administrative tribunal; (c) the degree of clarity or doubt about the question at issue; and (d) the extent to
which the issues involve, on the one
hand, the specialized understanding of
the agency or, on the other hand, the
interpretive abilities of courts in dealing
with statutory and constitutional questions.1)
B.

THE EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
IN MICHIGAN

The attitude of the Michigan courts
with respect to exhaustion of administrative remedies reflects an understanding of the general considerations discussed above. The doctrine that administrative remedies must normally be exhausted is viewed as a rule of orderly
procedure which embodies due and deferential regard for the legislative judgment and policy in providing expert administrative tribunals to deal with specialized fields. Yet the doctrine is not
viewed as an absolute jurisdictional
rule, but as a discretionary rule of
thumb to be departed from when the
interests of justice so require.
1. Cases requiring exhaustion. The typical case for the application of the ex10. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§20.01-20.10 (1958); Jaffe, Tlw Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, 12
Buffalo L. Rev. 327-57 (1963).
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haustion doctrine is one in which a
party seeks judicial relief without having taken an available and expeditious
appeal to higher administrative authorities. Two recent Michigan cases are ilhlstrative. In School District of Benton
Harbor v. State Tenure Comm'n," a
teacher left his classroom and stayed
away two (lays; when he sought to return he was told that his actions had
been taken as a resignation. He filed a
petition with the tenure commission,
which scheduled a hearing on the question whether the teacher had been discharged in violation of the tenure act.
At this point the school district brought
an injunction suit in the circuit court,
seeking to enjoin the commission from
holding the hearing. The circuit court
dismissed the suit on the ground that
the school district had not exhausted its
administrative remedies, and the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The
only issue in the case was whether the
teacher had voluntarily quit or had been
discharged, and this was precisely the
factual issue that the commission had
been authorized to determine. The administrative process would be shortcircuited if the trial of this issue of fact
could be shifted to the circuit court by
filing an injunction suit. judicial review
of the commission's determination was
fu]lb adequate to protect all of the
rights of the school district; in fact, a
proceeding for judicial review of the
commission's final order in the case
,conclhding that the teacher had been
unlawfully discharged) was pending in
circuit court when the Supreme Court
decided the appeal in the injunction
suit.
Norman v. Barber Examiners Board1"
is similar. The board notified a barber
to appear at a hearing to show cause
why his license should not be suspended
or revoked. Instead of responding to
this notice, the barber sought an injunction restraining the board from holding the hearing. He charged that the
11. 372 Mich. 270, 126 N.W.2d 102
(1964).
12. 364 Micb. 360, 111 NAV.2d 48
(]961).

13

board was "out to get" him and that his
opportunity to present witnesses would
be unduly restricted. The court held
that fear and apprehension concerning
what may happen at a proposed hearing
does not state a claim for injunctive relief, a result that seems clearly correct.
The board was the duly constituted
authority to hear factual issues involving
the revocation of barber license. The
statutory procedure would be disrupted
and the authority of the board abridged
if a litigant could get a court to hear
testimony that the board was biased
against him and would not conduct the
proposed hearing fairly. The barber's
allegations did not go to the competencv of the board to entertain the case,
but only to the possibility that it might
abuse its power in conducting ti~' hearing. If procedural errors in fact did
occur during a subsequent hearing, they
could be considered in an appeal from
the board's determination.
In cases such as Benion Harbor
School District and Norman. supra, all
the reasons favoring the exhaustion doc-'
trine (utilizing the experience and
jiudgment of the agency, avoiding piecemeal appeals, recognizing the primacy
of the agency in the field committed to
it by the legislature) are applicable.
There are no countervailing considerations which justify a departure from the
general rule.
Other Michigan cases are to the same
effect in closely analogous situations.
One important line of cases holds that
actions for injunctive or declaratory relief cannot be used as a substitute for
statutory review procedures. Thus in
Slezenger v. Liquor Control Comm'n,1 3
an administrative decision revoking a
liquor license could not be reviewed in
an injunction suit when the legislature
had prescribed a fully adequate method
of review by certiorari. Similarly. it was
held in Laiiness v. Yaegerm 4 that a declaratory judgment action could not be
13. 314 Mich. 644, 23 N.W.2d 243
(1946).
14. 352 Mich. 468, 90 NAV.2d 487
(1958).
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used as a substitute (apparently untimely) for the method of reviewing
employee pension claims prescribed by
statute. Another line of cases holds that
a member of a union must exhaust his
intra-union remedies before seeking judicial relief against the union for an
alleged failure of its fiduciary responsibilities. 15 In the Holman case," ' which
involved the seniority claims of employees who had been placed in a new
bargaining unit along with persons employed at a newly purchased plant, the
court also held that the plaintiffs, by
abandoning charges filed with the
NLRB when the regional director declined to issue a complaint, had failed
to exhaust remedies available under
federal law, which preempted the field;
the injunction suit in the state court,
therefore, was dismissed.
2. Cases

excusing failure

to exhaust

administrative remedies. As has already
been indicated, the exhaustion doctrine
is inapplicable unless an adequate and
expeditious administrative remedy, which
will substantially protect his claim of
right, is available to an individual. A
number of Michigan cases explore the
meaning of these prerequisites for the
application of the exhaustion doctrine.
The inadequacy of the administrative
remedy was involved in Trojan v. Taylor Township.17 A property owner requested township officials to issue a
building permit for the construction of
a trailer park. They refused to do so,
and, without exhausting his administrative remedy before the board of zoning
appeals, the property owner brought a
mandamus suit to compel issuance of
the permit. He alleged that the administrative remedy was "vain and useless"
because the officials had made up their
minds in advance. The court held that
15. Duff y v. Kelly, 353 Mich. 682, 91
N.W.2d 916 (1958): Cortez v. Ford Motor
Co., 349 Mich. 108, 126-27, 84 N.W.2d
523, 532 (1957); Holman v. Industrial S.
& Mfg. Co., 344 Mich. 235, 260-61, 74
N.W.2d 322, 333 (1955).
16. Holman v. Industrial S. & Mfg. Co.,
344 Mich. 235, 74 N.W.2d 322 (1955).
17. 352 Mich. 636, 91 N.W.2d 9
(1958).

mandamus jurisdiction could be exercised under such circumstances. The
court quoted with apparent approval
from the opinion of Judge Baum in the
circuit court:
. . . There is a general rule that persons seeking authority from a governmental unit must exhaust their remedies
within such governmental unit before
seeking relief in court. To this rule re-

quiring the plaintiff to exhaust his administrative remedies, there are a number of exceptions, one clear exception
is that the law will not require a citizen
to undertake a vain and useless act. The
law does not require useless expenditures of effort. Where it is clear that
resort to the administrative body is but
a formal step on the way to the courthouse, the law will not require such a
step to be taken.
In other cases the exhaustion doctrine
is inapplicable because the administrative agency does not have authority to
vindicate the claim of right asserte, by

the person invoking the jurisdiction of
the court. Thus, many cases allow constitutional questions to be raised in a
judicial proceeding in advance of any
administrative determination. In Dation
v. Ford Motor Co.,19 the court stated

the usual rule that constitutional questions are for judicial rather, than agency
determination: "Generally speaking, an
administrative board, commission or department possessing powers of [quasijudicial] character does not undertake to
determine constitutional questions."'
If the claim asserted does not involve
factual issues but rests upon constitutional interpretation, administrative remedies need not be exhausted because the
agency is not competent to resolve the
constitutional questions. It has been
repeatedly held, for example, that an
equity court may consider the constitutionality of regulatory or tax statutes

prior to an attempt to enforce them
against the complainant.

In Diggs v.

18. 352 Mich., at 638-39, 91 N.W.2d,
at 10.
19. 314 Mich.
(1946).

152, 22 N.W.2d 252

20. 314 Mich., at 159, 22 N.W.2d, at
255.
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State Board of Embalmers,2'1 a funeral
lirector, instead of taking an appeal
from an administrative proceeding in
which his license had been revoked,
brought a suit in equity in the circuit
court alleging that the licensing statute
was unconstitutional. It was held that
injunctive relief was available. The funeral director was not required to utilize a statutory procedure which he
claimed was part of the unconstitutional scheme; the remedy provided in the
license revocation proceeding, since it
could result in loss of livelihood to the
individual, is one that exposes him to
irreparable harm.
Thus it is well established in Michigan that where a licensing or other regulatory statute is attacked as unconstitutional, the court may grant injunctive
relief on a claim of irreparable injury
without requiring exhaustion of admin22
istrative remedies.
Other cases in which failure to exhaust administrative remedies has been
excused involve nonconstitutional claims
of right which for one reason or another need not be asserted before the
administrative agency. In London v.
City of Detroit.
Y " a property owner who
desired to continue to use land zoned
21. 321 Mich. 508, 32 N.W.2d 728
(1948), cert. denied 355 U.S. 885, 69 S.
Ct. 234, (1948).
22. Fitzpatrick v. Liquor Control
Cammn,
316 Mich. 83, 25 N.W.2d 118
(1946) (female bartenders could bring a
suit to enjoin the liquor control commission
from enforcing a statutory provision excluding women, with some exceptions,
from bartending); General Motors Corp. v.
Attorney General, 294 Mich. 558, 293
N.W. 751 (1940) (allegation that threatened criminal prosecutions will result in
irreparable harm must be taken as true on
motion to dismiss an injunction suit);
Lewis v. State Board of Dentistry, 277
Mich. 334, 269 N.W. 194 (1936) (dentists who were not in compliance with
statutory requirement that they practice
under the name stated on their licenses
could invoke equity jurisdiction, prior to
the institution of any administrative proceeding against them, to determine the constitutionality of the statutory requirement).
23. 354 Mich. 571, 93 N.W.2d 262
(1958).

for residential purposes as a parking lot
sought to enjoin the city from interfering with his plans. The failure to seek
a special permit, and the pendency of
an enforcement proceeding brought by
the city under the zoning ordinance,
did not prevent the court from granting
injunctive relief. The result turned on
the fact that the landowner's claim rested upon his assertion of preexisting use.
Since his rights stemmed from the zoning ordinance itself, which recognized
preexisting uses, he was not required to
apply for a permit to continue a valid
nonconforming use. In short, the rights
he *was asserting could not be vindicated in the administrative proceeding:
hence a resort to that procedure was unnecessary.
Other zoning cases seem to recognize
broader departures from the exhaustion
doctrine. In Long v. Township of Norton,24 it was held that the court might
interpret a zoning ordinance in a declaratory judgment proceeding even though
the property owner had not exhausted
his administrative remedies before the
township building inspector and the
zoning board of appeals. The court emphasized that only a legal question was
involved, "which does not turn upon any
disputed issue of fact...."25 In Long
v. City of Highland Park,-"' declaratory
and injunctive relief was obtained by a
property owner who alleged that the
zoning ordinance was unreasonable and
confiscatory as applied to his property.
The court stated that relief need not
first be sought from the zoning authorities because they "do not have the
power to declare the ordinance unconstitutional and void as applied to plaintiffs' property and they could not grant
the relief here sought. An attempt by
them to do so, which in effect would
result in a violation of the ordinance,
would have been ineffective."27
24. 327 Mich. 627, 42 N.W.2d 764
(1950).
25. 327 Mich., at 633, 42 N.W.2d, at
767.
26. 329 Mich. 146, 45 N.W.2d 10
(1951).
27. 329 Mich., at 149, 45 N.W.2d, at 11.
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3. Asserted lack of administrative jurisdiction. The most common situation involving the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine arises when attempts
are made to challenge the jurisdiction
of an agency in advance of completion
of an administrative proceeding. The
decisions - in Michigan and elsewhere
- appear on the surface to go both
ways; but when the cases are examined
in the light of the policy considerations
discussed at the outset of this paper,
an underlying consistency emerges.
The grounds on which administrative
jurisdiction is challenged make a difference. The easiest situation is that in
which the basic statute authorizing the
agency to act is alleged to be unconstitutional. Since agencies normally lack
power to hold their enabling legislation
unconstitutional, it is apparent that an
administrative proceeding cannot resolve
the claim of right which has been asserted. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies will not be required in this sitnation unless a factual hearing before
the administrative agency is necessarto develop a record on which the court
can better determine the constitutional
issues. In Michigan exhaustion has not
been required in this situation.8
Where the judicial challenge to agency jurisdiction is based on the ground
that the agency's exercise of jurisdiction
is unauthorized by its governing charter,
whether statute or constitution, failure
to exhaust administrative remedies is
commonly excused. In Ward v. Keenan,29 the leading case, Chief Justice
Vanderbilt stated that administrative
remedies need not be exhausted "...
first, when the jurisdiction of the statutory tribunal [is] questioned on persuasive grounds... ; second, when ...the
charges asserted before it [are] so palpably defective that its jurisdiction [is]
28. Long v. City of Highland Park, 329
Mich. 146. 45 N.W.2d 10 (1950); and see
the other cases cited in notes 19 and 22.
s1npra.

29. 3 N.J. 298, 70 A.2d 77 (1949).

BAR JOURNAL

merely colorable.. .."30 Similarly, other
state courts have declared that there is
an exception to the normal requirement
of exhaustion where the agency lacks
jurisdiction in the matter. 31
Only two Michigan cases seem to deal
with advance challenges to administrative jurisdiction, and they appear on the
face to go in opposite directions. In
Highland Park v. Fair Employment
Practices Conm'n,82 the city brought an
injunction proceeding in a circuit court
after the FEPC had initiated a proceeding involving charges that the city
was discriminating against Negroes in
employment. The city contended that
the FEPC was without authority to
hold the hearing because the fair employment practices act invaded municipal authority and was unduly vague. In
an appeal by the city from the dismissal
of the suit, the court held that the authority of the commission to entertain
the case should be considered and decided in this injunction suit prior to
the completion of the administrative
proceeding.
On the merits the court then upheld the authority of the commission to
entertain the complaint and to conduct
the hearing. The strength of the holding
on the jurisdictional question is en30. 3 N.J., at 308, 70 A.2d. at 8.
31. E.g., County of Los Angeles v.Department of Social Welfare. 41 Cal.2d 455,
260 P.2d 41 (1953); St. Luke's Hospital
v. Labor Relations Conum'n. :320 Mass. 467.
70 N.E.2d 10 (1946) (jurisdiction to conduct certification proceeding may be challenged without exhausting remedies): Western Pennsylvania Hospital N. Lichliter 340
Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206, 132 A.L.R. 1146
(1941) (jurisdiction of state labor board
may be challenged in injunction proceeding before board has completed its proceeding), cf. the recent case of Willamette
ValleJ Lumber Co. v. State Tax Comm'n,
226 Or. 543, 359 P.2d 98 (1961), in which
the court weighed factors of (1) irreparable injury, (2) doubt on the jurisdictional
question, and (3) relative competence of
agency and court to decide the question
in holding that the jurisdiction of state tax
commissioners to increase personal property
assessments could not be challenged until
after the taxes had been assessed and paid,
32. 364 Mich. 508, 11 \.XV.2d 797
(1961).
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hanced by the fact that the court did
iot entertain questions relating to the
validity of provisions governing the
manner of appeal from final commission
)rders. The appeal provisions, which
were separable from the remainder of
the act, could not be attacked until
after the administrative remedy had
been exhausted. The city was not invoking the appeal procedure, and it
was problematical whether it ever would
do so. But the exhaustion doctrine was
not applied to the basic question of the
commission's authority. In refusing to
accept the commission's contention that
the entire case should be dismissed because of the city's failure to exhaust adininistrative remedies. the court noted
that the portions of the bill relating to
the authority of the commission did not
present any factual issues for determination. "The claims of unconstitutionality
contained therein could properly have
been determined in this chancery proceeding on a motion to dismiss the
bill.":m

In School District of Royal Oak v.
State Tenure Comm'n,34 on the other

hand, the court applied the exhaustion
doctrine in holding that a school district could not obtain injunctive relief
against a tenure hearing before the
state commission prior to the completion
of the administrative proceeding. The

JOURNAL

new the contract of a teacher, claiming
that it was applying an established "retirement" policy. The teacher initiated
a proceeding before the tenure commission, seeking a hearing on the reasons for discharge. At this point the
school district, alleging that the commission had authority only of discharges
and not of "retirement," sought injunctive relief in the courts. The Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a
showing of hardship or irreparable harm,
judicial relief is not available unless administrative remedies have been exhausted. Although the language of the opinion, as is true of many of these cases,
is overly broad, the result is sound.
The jurisdiction of the commission
over teacher dismissals was clear and
unquestioned. Its authority ovei etirements as distinct from dismissals could
best be determined after a factual hearing by the agency. The court could not
pass intelligently upon the legal question
without exploring a number of factual
issues which had been delegated to the
tenure commission: What was the school
district's "retirement" policy? How had
it been administered in the past? Was
the practice of year-to-year renewals for
teachers over 60 years of age merely a
device to circumvent the statutory tenure requirements? Etc.

The facts of the Royal Oak case are
simple: a school district refused to re-

A current issue of concern is whether
uncertainties involving the constitutional
authority of Michigan's new Civil Rights
Commission can now be considered by
courts in advance of final disposition of
a case by the commission. There is
serious question, for example, whether
the Civil Rights Commission has any
authority to entertain proceedings involving racial discrimination in the field
of private housing. I have elsewhere
examined the materials which relate to
this question of constitutional interpretation and ventured certain conclusions.3 5 Suppose, for example, that a
property owner refuses to sell his home

33. 364 Mich., at 519, 111 N.W.2d,
34. 367 Mich. 689, 117 N.W.2d 181
(1962 ).

35. See Cramton, The Powers of the
Alichigan Civil Rights Commission, 63
Mich. L. Rev. 5-58 (1964).

school district's attack on the administrative proceeding purported to rest on
the connission's lack of jurisdiction. On
closer examination, however, it is apparent that the consideration favoring
the exhaustion doctrine outweighed the
opposing considerations. For the case
did not really present a legal question
involving the jurisdiction or authority of
the commission, but a factual dispute
on a matter within the competence and
specialized jurisdiction of the tenure
commission.
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to a Negro because of the latter's race.
No common or statutory law in Michigan provides any protection against this
form of private discrimination.- The
jurisdiction of the Civil Rights Commission, tinder article V, §29, of the 1963
constitution, extends only to "civil rights
guaranteed by law and by this constitution." Whether the new constitution
created enforceable guarantees against
racial discrimination in the field of private housing is clearly a matter of great
public importance. May that issue be
immediately taken to the courts by a
property owner who has been charged
with such discrimination in a proceeding brought before the commission? Or
does the doctrine that administrative
remedies must be exhausted preclude
an immediate judicial determination of
the constitutional question?

tutionally-created entity, remains an
administrative agency. The language
of article V, §29, which subjects the
commission to general laws governing "administrative agencies" and to
de novo review by the courts, clearly
indicates that the commission is an
"inferior tribunal." It is not empowered to determine the scope of the
constitutional rights which fall within
its jurisdiction. That is a legal question for the Michigan courts; no prior
administrative hearing will clarify the
meaning of the constitutional language. In short, the question involved
is not only without the expertise of
the agency but is beyond the agency's
competence in the sense that it can
be finally determined only by the
courts.

Moreover, the Civil Rights Commission, even though it is a consti-

(2)
The administrative proceeding
before the commission does not provide an adequate and expeditious
remedy for the claim of right raised
by the hypothetical property owner
who has been accused of discriminating in the sale of his home. His claim
of right goes to the commission's
total lack of any authoritv in this
area. Since the commission's view on
this question is well-kii0wn and predetermined, an administrative hearing
on the factual issue of whether discriminatory conduct did take place
serves no useful purpose. The commission, speaking through its co-chairmen and its executive director, has
repeatedly made it clear that it accepts the position advanced by Attorney General Frank J. Kelley, who
has declared that the 1963 constitution vested exclusive jurisdiction in
the commission to vindicate broad
new civil rights protecting individuals from private racial discrimination in the housing field.-7 There is
even some question whether the commission, even if it so desired, could
depart from the view expressed by

36. See McKibbin v. Corporatkni & Sec.
Comrn'n, 369 Mich. 69, 119 N.WV.2d 557
(1963).

37. Ops. Mich. Att'y Gen. No. 4161
(July 22, 1963); id., No. 4195 (Oct. 3,
1963); id., No. 4211 (Nov. 18, 1963).

The proper answer is not entirely
clear, but the manner in which it should
be resolved is. A deliberate weighing of
the considerations for and against the
application of the exhaustion doctrine
is called for. The following considerations might well enter into the balance:
(1) The extent to which Michigan's
new constitution created enforceable
rights in private citizens against the
discriminatory acts of other private
citizens is purely a question of law.
No factual materials will help to settle
that issue. It is a matter of constitutional interpretation which must be
decided upon the basis of the constituitional language and its legislative
history. The only materials that need
to be consulted are those which are
the proper subject of judicial notice
(the Journal of the Constitutional
Convention, the Address to the People, and, to a lesser extent, newspaper
and circular material explaining the
work of the constitutional convention).
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the chief law enforcement officer of
the state, prior to the expression of
differing views in an authoritative
judicial decision. As in Trojan v. Taylor Township,3 S the administrative
remedy would be "vain and useless,"
since it cannot result in a prompt
resolution of the question of constitutional interpretation.
(3)
It cannot be disputed that the
question of constitutional interpretation casts a large shadow upon any
assertion of power by the Civil Rights
Commission in the field of private
housing. There is no question but that
the issue is a serious and debatable
one. however it may be finally resolved. If the 1963 constitution did
not create enforceable new rights
against private discrimination, then
the commission is entirely without
jurisdiction in that important area,
since the commission's jurisdiction extends only to "the civil rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution."
The existing uncertainty prevents the
commission from taking the forceful
action in the housing field that it
might take if its authority were not so
doubtful. It prevents local governments, even those such as Ann Arbor
and Grand Rapids which have enacted fair housing ordinances, from seeking to remedy the evils of housing
discrimination by local action. And
it strengthens the hand of those in the
legislative branch of government who
would frustrate the protest movement
by stalling and temporizing. A prompt
and authoritative judicial resolution
of the legal issues would end this
period of paralysis.
(4)
A consideration which relates
only to the situation under discussion,
and not to the general problem of
exhaustion of administrative remedies,
arises from the language of the constitutional provision creating the Civil
Rights Commission. Article V, §29,
of the 1963 constitution, which creates
38. 352 Mich. 636, 91 N.W.2d 9 (1958).

the counmission and governs its powers, is qualified b\ the following sentence:
• . . Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to diminish
the right of any party to direct and
immediate legal or equitable remedies
in the courts of this state.
This sentence might be taken as obviating any consideration of the general principles relating to the exhaustion problem, since it refers to
the "right" of any "party" before the
commission "to direct and immediate"
"equitable" remedies in the courts of
the state. I believe such a view would
be mistaken. The sentence does not
create any new judicial remedies; it
merely preserves those which existed
at the time. If equitable relief against
administrative action could be obtained under prior law, the same remedies may be obtained against the
Civil Rights Commission today. The
framers were apparently concerned
lest the constitutional status of the
commission lead the courts to the erroneous conclusion that it should not
be treated in the same manner as
other administrative agencies. But the
framers did not intend to abolish the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies insofar as the Civil
Rights Commission was concerned.
(5) The only consideration weighing
in the other direction is the modest
showing of irreparable harm that can
be advanced by the property owner.
Forcing him to postpone judicial resolution of the questions of constitutional interpretation until after a factual
hearing by the commission will cause
him expense, inconvenience and embarrassment. His business practices
may be affected in the meantime. But
the degree of hardship and injury is
not very great.
The willingness of the Supreme
Court in Highland Park v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n,39 to con39. 364 Mich.
(1961).
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sider the constitutionality of the fair
employment practices act prior to the
completion of the administrative hearing suggests that the same approach
is likely to be taken in the analogous
situation under discussion. Support
might also be drawn from cases involving the same questions which
have arisen in other jurisdictions. Le-

vitt & Sons v. State Division Against
Discrimination,40 is squarely in point.
A housing-project developer was
charged in complaints filed with the
division with discriminating against
individual Negroes in the sale of
houses. When conciliation failed, the
complaints were set for administrative hearing. The developer then
brought suit in a trial court of general jurisdiction, challenging the jurisdiction of the division to hear the
complaints and attacking the constitutionality of the underlying statute.
The trial court dismissed the suit on
ground that the developer had failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court held
that the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable:
Since the questions involved in this
appeal relate to the jurisdiction of the
administrative agency and the constitutionality of the statute on which the
administrative action in question is
based, it is apparent that plaintiffs
should not be made to exhaust their
administrative remedies before pur.
suing the present action. Fischer v.
Bedminister Tp., 5 N.J. 534, 76 A.2d
673 (1950); Ward v. Keenan, 3 N.J.
298, 302-309, 70 A.2d 77 (1949). The
questions are purely legal, an area
where the administrative expertise
would be of no real value. Under such
circumstances, we have consistently
held that exhaustion of administrative
remedies will not be required. Honigfeld v. Byrnes, 14 N.J. 600, 604, 103
A.2d 598 (1954); Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477, 89 A.2d 13
(1952).41
40. 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960),
appeal dismissed 363 U.S. 418, 80 S. Ct.
1215 (1960).
41. 31 N.J., at 523; 158 A.2d, at 181.
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Similarly, a New York court considered and upheld the constitutionality of a New York City fair housing ordinance even though the plaintiff had not exhausted
his adminis42
trative remedies.
CONCLUSION
In Michigan and elsewhere, cases involving the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies contain overly
broad language indicating that exhaustion is always required or never required. Upon closer analysis, however,
the decisions appear to reflect a careful balancing of relevant considerations.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
is required when early resort to a court
will endanger the objectives of the exhaustion doctrine: furthering orderly
procedure, preserving the efficiency of
the administrative process, conserving
judicial energies, and propertly allocating responsibilities between agencies
and courts. On the other hand, the exhaustion doctrine is not applied - mechanically or unthinkingly - when other
considerations outweigh the objectives
of the exhaustion rule. Thus, the Michigan cases do not require exhaustion
when (1) the plaintiff would suffer
serious injury if he were required to exhaust his administrative remedy; or
(2) the issue which he raises is a
doubtful question of law which is not
within the competence or the expertise
of the administrative agency. A viable
jurisprudence emerges when one consults, not the broad language of isolated
cases, the holdings of the decisions.
However, a greater degree of articulation of the controlling factors in the
opinions would be desirable, since it
would make the law easier to understand and to administer.
42. Martin v. City of New York, 22 Misc.
2d 389, 201 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Supreme Court
1960). The recent case of Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 93 A.L.R.2d
1012 (Mo. 1962), allowed a restaurant
owner to use a declaratory judgment action
to attack an ordinance prohibiting racial
discrimination in places of public accommodation.
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